Because of its deep history of racially discriminatory politics, 15 Louisiana must-in developing voting rules-comply with section 5, the most celebrated and controversial provision of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965. 16 Section 5 requires Louisiana and other "covered jurisdictions" 17 to preclear all changes in their voting laws with either the Department of Justice (DOJ) or a special three-judge district court in Washington, D.C., before the changes take effect. 18 The provision was originally crafted in response to the persistent and creative tactics employed by covered jurisdictions to avoid federal civil rights mandates. 19 By demanding preclearance for all voting changes-from the seemingly insignificant and uncontested, to the most critical and controversial-section 5 enlists the federal government as a constant chaperone in matters of state election administration.
The test used to enforce section 5, which I will call the "static benchmarking" test, 20 was conceived by the Supreme Court in Beer v. United States to ward off voting changes that would result in a "retrogression" in minority voters' "effective exercise of the electoral franchise." 21 The static benchmarking procedure detects movements in minority political power by WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 2006 , at A9 (quoting one political scientist as saying, "in blunt terms, some white voters see this as an opportunity to take back power"). ACT, 1965 -1990 , at 103 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994 .
16. 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § § 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2000) ).
17. See infra note 37. 139, 140 (1984) (calling it "the retrogression test").
21. 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) .
comparing a proposed voting change to the existing voting laws in the jurisdiction seeking preclearance. If, applied to the current circumstances, the proposed law increases minority political power relative to the existing law, it is deemed "ameliorative" and is precleared. 22 If the proposed law diminishes minority political power, it is deemed "retrogressive" and is permanently enjoined from taking effect. 23 The static comparison thus guards against the crumbling of minority political power under the weight of new, retrogressive laws and ensures that, in the face of a retrogressive proposal, the status quo ante holds firm. 24 Despite its unrivaled success in advancing and protecting minority political gains, 25 section 5 quietly suffered one of its most disappointing failures in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, as the static benchmarking test fell apart. Critically, static benchmarking assumes that current laws are capable of preserving existing minority political power; 26 indeed, it is the step that completes the test's "sixth-grade arithmetic." 27 Katrina shattered this 22. Id.
23.
Id. If a proposed voting change neither increases nor decreases minority voting strength, it is also entitled to preclearance under section 5. See City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 134 n.10 (1983) (" [T] he Beer Court did not distinguish between ameliorative changes and changes that simply preserved current minority voting strength. The Court explained that the purpose of § 5 was to prohibit only retrogressive changes.").
24.
In this Note, I use the terms "minority political power," "minority voting power," and "minority influence" interchangeably to refer to minority voters' "effective exercise of the electoral franchise"-a concept that is inherently broad. Determining whether there has been retrogression in minority voters' effective exercise of the electoral franchise "depends on an examination of all the relevant circumstances, such as the ability of minority voters to elect their candidate of choice, the extent of the minority group's opportunity to participate in the political process, and the feasibility of creating a nonretrogressive plan." Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 479 (2003) . Furthermore, "'[n] o single statistic provides courts with a shortcut to determine whether' a voting change retrogresses from the benchmark." Id. at 480 (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 -21 (1994 ).
25.
For data on the impact of the VRA on Louisiana politics, see Engstrom et al., supra note 15, at 103. assumption and, in the process, vindicated Justice Thurgood Marshall's prescient warning that static benchmarking "will not always be [able] to determine whether a new plan increases or decreases Negro voting power relative to the prior plan." 28 Marshall was concerned that in some contexts, a proposed law might always appear "positive-no matter how good or bad the result." 29 Hurricane Katrina provided a perfect example of what Justice Marshall feared. The massive human displacement and immense election infrastructure damage caused by the storm rendered Louisiana's existing voting laws inadequate to conduct post-disaster elections: the number of absentee voters swelled, and those who remained in New Orleans lacked water, electricity, and stable shelter, much less access to polling locations and the Postal Service. 30 If Louisiana held a post-Katrina election with the pre-Katrina voting laws, minority voting power would collapse; 31 only aggressive procedural reforms could avoid this outcome. Yet when the state sought to preclear its emergency voting reforms, the static benchmarking test stubbornly relied on the inadequate pre-Katrina voting plan as a valid benchmark for comparison. Conceptually, this meant that compared to the broken pre-Katrina benchmark, almost any proposed law would appear ameliorative and would merit preclearance. A covered jurisdiction could therefore enact reforms that, despite improving existing laws, stopped far short of providing minority voters with the realistic opportunity to maintain their voting strength. 32 Simply put, Hurricane Katrina revealed a blind spot in section 5's enforcement powers.
This Note shines a critical light on section 5's post-Katrina failure and suggests a narrowly tailored doctrinal "fix" to repair the provision. The proposed model replaces the static benchmarking test with a more flexible counterpart that I call "dynamic benchmarking." Instead of automatically using existing voting laws as a benchmark, this procedure employs a multifactor examination to ensure that the current regime is actually capable of preserving minority political power. In the absence of a suitable existing benchmark, the dynamic test offers a "replacement benchmark"-a model voting plan that, if used after a disaster, would likely preserve minority influence. The replacement 28. Beer, 425 U.S. at 153 n.12 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
29.
Id. at 154 n.12. 
31.
See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
32.
See infra Section II.B for a discussion that explains this phenomenon in greater detail.
benchmark thus resurrects section 5's coercive power; if a covered jurisdiction proposes a post-disaster voting plan that is less robust than the replacement benchmark, preclearance will be denied.
33
The discussion that follows proceeds in three Parts. Part I introduces section 5 and outlines its development. It then details the contours of the static benchmarking test that has long defined section 5's administration. Part II recounts for the first time the post-Katrina preclearance process and diagnoses section 5's inability to adapt to the unprecedented challenges posed by Katrina. Part III unveils the dynamic benchmarking model and argues that it is both necessary and justified to remedy section 5's weaknesses. Finally, the Conclusion calls on Congress to amend section 5 and to incorporate dynamic benchmarking as an alternative to the current static procedure. In addition to presenting traditional arguments for congressional action, it departs from doctrine to provide an alternative justification for the model I offer.
i. an "uncommon" enforcement tool

A. Two Generations of Section 5
Since its enactment in 1965, section 5 of the Voting Rights Act has proven to be the nation's most innovative and successful civil rights enforcement tool. The provision's history is aptly divided into two "generations" of enforcement: the first generation focused primarily on providing equal access to the ballot box, while the second generation has been concerned with eradicating more subtle barriers to minority political empowerment. This Section briefly considers each generation in turn.
The first generation of section 5 enforcement occurred in response to the "unremitting and ingenious" tactics employed by certain states and localities-33. Although the merits of this proposal are discussed more fully infra Section III.A, it is in part attractive because it takes no particular position in the longstanding debate on section 5's merit, attempting only to fortify a central pillar of voting rights law. mostly in the former Confederacy-to deny black citizens the right to vote despite contrary federal mandates. 34 Prior congressional attempts to enfranchise black voters had generally been ignored by recalcitrant jurisdictions, and "[i]n those relatively few instances when a court actually enjoined a discriminatory practice, the affected jurisdiction would simply adopt a new exclusionary tactic not covered by the court order-sometimes within twenty-four hours." 35 To thwart the "outguess[ing]" of congressional and judicial mandates, 36 section 5 forced covered jurisdictions 37 to obtain preclearance from the DOJ or a declaratory judgment from a special threejudge district court in the District of Columbia before a new voting law could take effect. The covered jurisdiction maintained the burden of proving that its proposed voting laws would not disadvantage minority voters. Until convinced otherwise, 38 the federal government would presume that the jurisdiction's proposed changes either reflected a racially discriminatory intent or would produce a racially discriminatory effect. Section 5 thus cast a decidedly skeptical eye on all voting changes in covered jurisdictions. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Supreme Court blessed this "uncommon" 39 enforcement structure-and its departure from federal deference to the states in election administration-so that the nation could finally "shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of [voting discrimination] to its victims."
40
The focus on ensuring equal access to the ballot resulted in immediate success, evidenced by dramatic increases in minority registration and political participation throughout covered jurisdictions. Despite this first generation success, subtle structural barriers hindered the growth of minority political power. Covered jurisdictions, fearing that minority electoral victories would flow from increased minority political participation, deployed seemingly race-neutral strategies to minimize the electoral power of the newly enfranchised citizens. 42 For instance, many jurisdictions adopted laws mandating that all candidates win elections in "atlarge" districts, instead of in more localized, single-member districts. 43 This kind of institutional design change effectively prevented minority voters from forming electoral majorities in smaller districts where they were numerically dominant.
44
The retreat behind this race-neutral veil prompted the Supreme Court in Allen v. State Board of Elections to broaden section 5's substantive reach to consider "the subtle, as well as the obvious" roadblocks employed by covered jurisdictions to frustrate minority political advancement. 45 The Court recognized that "[t]he right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot."
46 Thus, seemingly harmless voting changes that diminished minority voting power were deemed just as illicit as outright vote denials. After Allen, stratagems such as at-large districting changes, run-off requirements, and voter identification laws required section 5 preclearance to ensure that they were not stalking horses for discriminatory voting practices. In this so-called second generation of section 5 enforcement, the provision has demonstrated its extraordinary ability to advance and protect minority political power. Indeed, the move toward a more robust vision for section 5 "was arguably of greater importance in advancing black electoral opportunity than even the dismantling of literacy tests." 47 42. See Tokaji, supra note 19, at 794 (noting the tactics used to keep "legislative bodies largely segregated even after the VRA's enactment"). 
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B. The Beer Retrogression Standard
In a key 1976 decision, the Supreme Court unveiled the doctrinal standard that has long guided section 5's administration. Beer v. United States 48 involved the review of New Orleans's 1970 city council redistricting plan, which created a black voting majority in one out of the city's five councilmanic districts. With the existence of racial bloc voting, or the cleavage of voting patterns along racial lines, this configuration meant that black voters would likely elect one black representative to the council. The city's proposed plan stood in contrast to the previous councilmanic plan, which included no districts with a black voting majority and under which, predictably, no black candidate had won election to the council.
The city of New Orleans first submitted its new plan to the Department of Justice for administrative preclearance but was twice rebuffed after the DOJ objected that the proposed plan would not give minorities adequate voting strength-that is, strength in proportion to their population. 49 The city subsequently sought preclearance from the three-judge district court, which also refused to sanction the new plan, holding that it had "the effect of abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." 50 The court noted that the city's reapportionment plan realistically only provided minority voters with the chance to elect one black representative to the five-person body, despite the fact that black residents accounted for a substantially larger proportion of the city's population. 51 In other words, although the new plan was an improvement over the previous plan, it was not good enough to merit preclearance.
The city appealed directly to the Supreme Court, 52 arguing that the district court applied an erroneous preclearance standard under section 5. A five-Justice majority of the Court agreed and, in the process, declared that a plan would merit preclearance as long as it did not "retrogress" minority political power. § 1973c (2000) .
53.
Beer, 425 U.S. at 141 ("[T]he purpose of § 5 has always been to insure that no votingprocedure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.").
The Court's new "retrogression standard" 54 meant that a section 5 objection would attach only if a proposed change left minority voters with less political power than they had previously enjoyed. Under this standard, the Court found that the voting change in Beer was clearly ameliorative. Compared to the previous plan, which provided no minority representation, the new plan would reasonably lead to the election of one minority council representative. The city's failure to go further in its reapportionment plan was immaterial because, with respect to minority political power, the new plan was clearly an improvement over its predecessor.
Despite the Beer Court's assertion that the retrogression standard had "always" been the lodestar of section 5 review, 55 it relied on a thin slice of the VRA's legislative history to justify its holding. 56 The Court cited a House of Representatives report that declared that section 5 should detect whether minority political power is "augmented, diminished, or not affected" by a proposed law. 57 Relying heavily on this legislative language, the Court concluded that section 5 demanded a static comparison of a covered jurisdiction's proposed and existing plans to detect impermissible movements in minority power. The existing plan established a baseline or benchmark of minority power against which new laws should be compared. 58 Changes that augmented minority power relative to the existing plan would merit preclearance; changes that diminished minority political power would not. NO. 94-196, at 60 (1975) With the static benchmarking test, section 5 thus established a "one-way ratchet" for minority political power.
60
Since Beer, the Court has consistently relied on the static test to enforce the retrogression standard and the "limited substantive" role it grants section 5.
61
Read as a whole, the Court's section 5 jurisprudence stands for a simple proposition: the retrogression standard, properly applied, promises only that minority voters will be protected from an impermissible "backsliding" in their political power.
62 So understood, the animating concern of section 5 is the preservation, not the advancement or maximization, of minority voting strength. 63 even before submission to the DOJ. 66 A preclearance denial serves a powerful shaming function, 67 as rejection is a publicly announced indictment that a covered jurisdiction's democratic process is tainted by racial discrimination.
Historical data tracking preclearance submissions attest to the provision's deterrent power. The majority of voting changes are crafted "in the shadow of section 5" and are therefore easily precleared. 68 Others are quickly amended after the fact to address concerns expressed by the DOJ. Functioning in this manner, the preclearance process lends the DOJ coercive power and the ability to negotiate with a covered jurisdiction from a position of strength.
69 Unless a jurisdiction is willing to endure the more onerous judicial preclearance process, DOJ review is the final word on whether a proposed plan ever becomes law. 70. Though covered jurisdictions may obtain preclearance administratively from the DOJ or judicially from the three-judge district court, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions opt for administrative preclearance. Compared to judicial preclearance, administrative review offers a faster, less expensive method of obtaining preclearance. The DOJ only has sixty days to grant or deny preclearance after the proposed change is submitted for review. If the sixty days pass without a decision, the proposed change automatically takes effect. If the Voting Section of the DOJ, which performs the bulk of the analysis and investigation during a review, requires more information, it can submit a formal request that automatically resets the sixty-day clock. See Civil Rights Div., About Section 5, supra note 37.
preclearance process and ultimately diagnoses section 5 as doctrinally unequipped to adapt to the post-Katrina challenge.
A. The Emergency Voting Plan
Operating without a historical model and under heightened public scrutiny, 71 the Louisiana government was charged with crafting an emergency voting plan to respond to the damage caused by Katrina. After chronicling the legislative battle to reform simple voting procedures, this Section details the controversy surrounding a crucial point of contention: whether the state would rely on traditional mail-based forms of absentee voting to accommodate Katrina's displaced, or whether it would instead adopt a far-reaching "satellite voting" measure that would allow the displaced to vote in person at polling sites located around the country.
72
Governor Kathleen Blanco began the post-Katrina reform process by taking two decisive actions. First, she issued an executive order delaying New Orleans's primary and general municipal elections, which were to be held in February and March 2006, respectively. 73 On its face, the executive order was an honest admission that, months after Katrina hit, the city was still too devastated to conduct a fair and safe election. consider. 75 One item asked the legislature to suspend the annual voter canvass, a process mandated by state law to verify that all registered voters were still residents of their home parishes. 76 A voter who had moved outside his home parish and had, for instance, filed a change of address form with the Postal Service could be declared ineligible and removed from the voter rolls. If it remained in effect, the canvass could disqualify nearly all displaced voters who were now living outside of New Orleans. 77 A second item sought the creation of a framework statute to empower the state's chief election officer, the Secretary of State, to formulate a logistical plan for post-disaster voting.
78 Both items were modest and uncontroversial and therefore easily passed the legislature.
79
Despite the ease with which these reforms obtained approval, another seemingly uncontroversial procedural reform-a bill introduced by a state senator to relax a state law that prohibited first-time voters from voting absentee in their first election-was defeated.
80 The legislature's rejection of this proposal raised suspicions of its unwillingness to take aggressive steps to help displaced residents participate in the elections. Preserving the first-time absentee voter rule would bar nearly 10,000 newly registered-and newly displaced-voters from participating in New Orleans's municipal elections unless they returned to the city to vote in person.
81 At a hearing concerning the pace and scope of the state's election reforms, 82 Judge Ivan Lemelle-the presiding federal judge-brought up the legislature's rejection of the relaxed absentee voter proposal "out of the blue" 83 and strongly hinted that if the legislature did not reconsider its rejection, he was prepared "to take over [the] elections."
84 Likely motivated in part by this threat of judicial intervention, the legislature adopted the absentee voting reform during the second emergency session.
85
The legislature, however, refused to proceed with other voting reforms, including a proposal that would have allowed displaced residents to vote early at selected offices of the registrar outside of Orleans Parish. Although the reform was considered a relatively uncontroversial precursor to more farreaching proposals preferred by some lawmakers and civil rights groups, the legislature, voting along party and racial lines, rejected the provision. 86 This rejection prompted black lawmakers to walk out of the legislature in protest, accusing the opposition of being motivated by racial animus and opportunism.
87 Following the walkout, one state senator commented that The protest dramatically raised the stakes by highlighting the legislature's inaction. Judge Lemelle convened a conference call with state officials, warning that the legislature's intransigence could "lead to the disenfranchisement of Orleans Parish [v] oters" and could prompt him to intervene "[i]f the legislature fails to deal with this issue in a manner that complies with federal Voting Rights laws." 90 Demonstrating once again that it responded best to the threat of intervention, the legislature approved the early voting measure only two days after first rejecting it.
91
The legislature's hard line against seemingly uncontroversial reforms chilled serious consideration of the principal voting reform sought by several lawmakers and civil rights groups-the establishment of "satellite voting" locations for displaced residents living outside the state. Instead of having voters cast their ballots through the mail, the satellite procedure would allow citizens to cast their votes in person at polling stations established in areas with substantial concentrations of Katrina evacuees. 92 The 103. In addition to the reforms discussed above, the state's emergency plan consisted largely of a voter information campaign to notify displaced citizens of their voting rights, the provision of additional election commissioners, and the provision of additional voting equipment. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 6, paras. 36-40, at 9-10.
constituted an impermissible vote denial under section 2 of the VRA 104 and an illicit burden on the right to vote under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. 105 But given the lack of supportive doctrine, 106 these creative legal arguments failed to convince the court that the legislature-by refusing to do more-violated statutory or constitutional authority.
107
The basket of legislative reforms thus remained modest. Displaced voters would be exempt from first-time absentee voter rules, would avoid the direct disenfranchisement associated with the annual voter canvass, and would be permitted to vote early at selected sites within the state. In addition, the legislature authorized the Secretary of State to outline a plan to conduct a voter information campaign to reach the displaced. demonstrated, many of these reforms were contested, and some were initially rejected before a combination of political pressure and threatened judicial intervention prompted the legislature to adopt them. The legislature's actions hardly demonstrated an eagerness to accommodate Katrina evacuees, and its limited emergency reforms seemed to constitute the bare minimum needed to conduct post-disaster elections. Whether these reforms would preserve minority voting power was a question for section 5 preclearance to resolve.
B. The Preclearance Paradox
With the legislative reform process completed, Louisiana sought to preclear its emergency plan with the DOJ. The DOJ had been expecting the state's submission and had even contacted state officials immediately after Katrina to promise to "expedite the review of any and all submissions of voting changes" to deal with Katrina's aftermath.
108
The state's reforms were subjected to the static benchmarking test to ensure that its voting changes did not retrogress minority political power. When faced with Louisiana's post-Katrina emergency voting plan, however, the static benchmarking test fell apart and deprived the DOJ of the ability to make any credible threat to deny preclearance. To understand this breakdown, it is helpful to retrace the simple procedural steps that defined the static analysis. First, the static test used Louisiana's pre-Katrina voting laws (applied to the post-Katrina state of affairs) as the benchmark for comparison. It then compared the state's proposed emergency voting plan (also applied to the postKatrina state of affairs) against this benchmark and asked whether minority voters would be better off with the reforms than without them. 109 Predictably, the test concluded that the state's voting reforms were ameliorative, implying that minority voting power would increase as a result of the emergency plan.
110
This conclusion is undoubtedly correct in a narrow sense: the procedural reforms, combined with the voter information campaign, would increase minority voting strength relative to an election held without the reforms. Yet a closer look reveals a critical lapse in the static analysis. The preKatrina laws, if used for a post-Katrina election, clearly would have led to a dramatic reduction in minority voting power. For instance, residency requirements alone would have disenfranchised a substantial portion of the hundreds of thousands of displaced residents living outside the state. 111 The DOJ was nevertheless doctrinally bound to use the anachronistic pre-Katrina laws as a benchmark. The use of this benchmark essentially predetermined the outcome of the static test: compared to the pre-Katrina plan, virtually any postKatrina plan would appear ameliorative, even one that led to a substantial decrease in minority voting power from pre-Katrina levels. This result rendered the retrogression standard a nullity and undermined the usefulness of the static test as a workable barometer of illicit reductions in minority voting power.
It was a critical assumption built into the static benchmarking procedure that preordained this result: static benchmarking presumes that a jurisdiction's existing voting laws will preserve minority voting strength.
112 In most cases, this assumption is unproblematic; as long as the circumstances in the jurisdiction do not dramatically change, existing laws will likely maintain minority influence. However, the logic of static benchmarking breaks down if the test's animating assumption is called into question by an intervening event that renders the existing voting plan unable to preserve minority voting strength.
To illustrate, imagine a jurisdiction that allows citizens to vote only by mail. 113 Under normal circumstances and under the existing laws, minority citizens in the jurisdiction consistently wield enough voting influence to elect six out of ten members of the city council. Now imagine that a disaster hits this jurisdiction and cripples the Postal Service in predominantly minority neighborhoods. As a result of the damage to this crucial election infrastructure, minority participation would predictably suffer-compared to their usual six city council seats, minority voters might, for instance, control only three. Simply stated, the predisaster plan would fail to preserve minority political power.
Static benchmarking would nevertheless use this deficient plan as a valid benchmark for comparison when a post-disaster law was submitted for preclearance. As long as the new law made voters relatively better off-for instance, by permitting alternative forms of voting-the government would deem it ameliorative and would grant preclearance. This result would occur despite the real possibility that the new law might stop short of maintaining minority control of six council seats. The new regime might instead result in minority control of only four seats-clearly an improvement over the three seats the existing laws would provide in a post-disaster election, but also fewer than the six seats that had long characterized minority political power in the jurisdiction. The precleared law could thus appear ameliorative relative to the broken benchmark but still result in an unmistakable retrogression in minority influence from its predisaster level. This wrinkle in static benchmarking's normally straightforward logic exerts a crippling effect on section 5's ability to avoid reductions in minority political power.
114
The above scenario epitomizes a longstanding concern about static benchmarking.
115 When confronted with complex circumstances such as an unprecedented disaster, the procedure's one-dimensional analysis, often seen as its principal strength, 116 becomes a decisive weakness. Instead of preventing clearly retrogressive outcomes, static benchmarking unwittingly blesses them.
The DOJ's posture during the post-Katrina preclearance process reflected this paradox. The Justice Department admittedly held no leverage over Louisiana 117 and had no choice but to preclear any plan, no matter how uncharitable, that improved the pre-Katrina voting laws. To its credit, the DOJ used its communications with Louisiana officials to encourage the state to include particular voting procedures.
118 Yet had the state declined the DOJ's advice out of hand, it would still have received preclearance. This paradox makes section 5 a paper tiger in the aftermath of an unprecedented disaster. It gives the DOJ the veneer of coercive power without actually empowering it to withhold preclearance from anyone except the "incompetent retrogressor." 119 Also, without the threat of a preclearance denial, jurisdictions that might normally legislate "in the shadow of the law" to gain section 5 approval are 114. I am indebted to Robert Scott for helpful discussions on this point. 320, 332 (2000) . It refers to "a jurisdiction that has intended-but failed-to effect a retrogression" in minority political power. Donahue, supra note 54, at 1661.
effectively freed from any substantive obligations under the provision. A jurisdiction may then choose to take only minor steps to avoid retrogression, knowing that section 5 no longer has the potential to fall like the "sword of Damocles."
iii. retrogression reconsidered
Having identified a troubling blind spot in section 5's administration, I now propose a doctrinal "fix" to resurrect section 5's post-disaster enforcement power. This Part presents an alternative to the static benchmarking test that is actually capable of upholding the modest retrogression principle announced by the Court in Beer.
A. Dynamic Benchmarking
Although static benchmarking has long defined section 5's administration, nothing in Beer or its progeny suggests that it is mandated. Instead, the single lodestar of section 5's administration is the retrogression standard-the promise that minority voting power will never backslide, or retrogress, as a result of new voting laws. Because static benchmarking is incapable of enforcing this retrogression standard after a disaster, I propose a more effective "dynamic benchmarking" alternative.
120
The dynamic benchmarking model comprises two steps. The first step applies a multifactor threshold examination of existing voting laws to ensure that they are capable of preserving minority voting strength. If the existing laws cannot preserve this strength, the DOJ or district court will be barred from using them as a valid benchmark. The second step then mandates that the DOJ or district court develop a "replacement benchmark"-a model voting plan that, if used in a post-disaster election, would give minority voters a realistic opportunity to preserve their voting strength. These steps enable dynamic benchmarking to reject post-disaster voting plans that are technically 120. It is important to emphasize that the dynamic proposal I advance is limited to disaster situations. Although the proposal might seem like a nuanced alternative to the static test's blunt application, expanding its application beyond disasters-to reach situations in which, for instance, gradual changes in demographics reduce minority voting strength-would likely outstrip section 5's constitutional mandate. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 983 (1996) (plurality opinion) (cautioning that the retrogression standard is "not a license for the State to do whatever it deems necessary to ensure continued minority electoral success" (emphasis omitted)).
ameliorative compared to predisaster laws yet actually result in illicit retrogression.
Assessing the Existing Voting Regime
The first step in dynamic benchmarking is a threshold examination of a jurisdiction's existing voting laws to determine whether they are truly capable of maintaining existing minority voting strength. The DOJ or district court should be empowered to question the workability of existing voting laws in light of an intervening event, such as a storm or terrorist attack. A logical trigger for this initial examination is a federal disaster declaration under the Stafford Act. 121 To ensure a principled review, the inquiry should be guided by clear factors including, but not limited to: (1) the extent of voter displacement, (2) damage to the infrastructure and channels of election administration, and (3) racial disparities in voting patterns that would be exacerbated by the existing plan. These factors, which are briefly discussed below, are meant to signal the kind of broad threshold inquiry sought by dynamic benchmarking. By investigating each factor, the DOJ or district court should gain an accurate sense of the extent of democratic damage caused by a disaster.
First, the extent of voter displacement-a concept that includes the number of displaced voters, their geographic locations, and the projected duration of displacement-can have a direct impact on whether existing voting laws can adapt to a post-disaster election. For instance, although a jurisdiction's strict absentee voting requirements may normally make sense as an anti-fraud mechanism, after a disaster, these once-reasonable restrictions can erect a substantial administrative barrier for displaced voters who wish to vote from afar.
Second, measuring potential damage to the infrastructure and channels of election administration can help determine whether existing laws can logistically execute a fair contest. A disaster has the potential to cause significant damage to critical infrastructure, such as the Postal Service, that voters rely upon to receive information both from the government and from candidates seeking their votes. A voting regime that relies primarily on the Postal Service to distribute voter information-and, more importantly, absentee ballots-will be hamstrung if this normally stable channel is closed or disabled after a disaster. In addition to damaging the Postal Service, disasters can also destroy the places where citizens have become accustomed to voting. The need to eliminate or consolidate polling locations can contribute to the conclusion that existing voting plans are inadequate to maintain status quo voting power, particularly if minority voters are disproportionately affected by the damage.
Finally, a localized analysis of voting patterns, such as a racial group's preference for certain methods of voting, can illuminate the extent to which existing voting laws would be unable to maintain minority voting power. For example, if a jurisdiction's minority residents have historically disfavored absentee voting relative to the rest of the jurisdiction's voters, a voting plan's heavy reliance on absentee voting as the only alternative to traditional voting should be viewed skeptically. Of course, in the aftermath of a disaster, the DOJ may not be able to conclude that a jurisdiction's minority voters disfavor a particular form of voting because they are racial minorities. Nevertheless, the existence of racially divergent voting preferences should itself counsel caution when considering whether a voting scheme is capable of preserving minority voting strength.
This type of multifactor analysis will not be overly burdensome for the covered jurisdictions, the DOJ, or the district court. The covered jurisdictions will be charged with producing the necessary data for the analysis but will be aided by the proliferation of data-driven studies that normally follow a major disaster. 122 The DOJ or the district court will be responsible for conducting the inquiry, but both have consistently proved capable of digesting and synthesizing complex data pertaining to voting plans and voting groups. 123 In particular, the DOJ, as first among equals in enforcing section 5, has deep experience with the racial dynamics in the covered jurisdictions. It can continue to rely on its informal network of elected officials and community activists for help with the intensely localized post-disaster review that dynamic benchmarking demands.
124 Thus, although dynamic benchmarking's threshold inquiry is not costless, it also does not pose a substantial burden. (2006)) (asserting that the DOJ can base a section 5 determination "on the appraisal of a complex set of facts"); Donahue, supra note 54, at 1672 ("[E]xamination of the Department's past enforcement practices reveals a rich history of localized and nuanced review.").
124. See Gerken, supra note 65, at 725 (noting the role that local stakeholders already play in advising the DOJ during its preclearance process); Donahue, supra note 54, at 1675 ("The Department maintains files with names of minority contacts in particular jurisdictions and routinely reaches out to these individuals in evaluating the likely impact of a specific change.").
If the threshold inquiry demonstrates that the existing voting plan is an acceptable baseline for comparison, then the DOJ or district court should proceed with the traditional static benchmarking procedure. A proposed voting change can then be safely measured against the existing voting plan to detect retrogression. However, if the threshold inquiry demonstrates that the existing voting plan is in fact incapable of preserving minority voting strength, the DOJ or district court should proceed to the second step of the dynamic benchmarking model.
Selecting a Replacement Benchmark
The second step in the dynamic process requires the DOJ or the district court to select a replacement benchmark-a concrete voting plan that would likely preserve minority political power in a post-disaster world. Importantly, the replacement benchmark would not be a "license for the State to do whatever it deems necessary to ensure continued electoral success."
125 Rather, the replacement benchmark would only ensure that a minority group's "opportunity to elect representatives of its choice not be diminished."
126 The distinction is slight, but important: the replacement benchmark is not a mandate to guarantee political spoils; it should only present minority voters with a realistic opportunity to avert retrogression. For example, if minority voters have historically used their political power to elect a minority representative, the replacement benchmark should be a voting plan that preserves a realistic opportunity to continue that success. It should not, however, stack the voting deck in order to turn that opportunity into an absolute certainty-a potential violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
127
If a proposed voting change improves or simply maintains minority influence relative to the replacement benchmark, it warrants preclearance. But if the proposed change falls short of the replacement benchmark-for instance, by suggesting post-disaster reforms that are too modest to preserve minority power-it should be denied preclearance. Under dynamic benchmarking, the fact that a post-disaster plan is technically ameliorative no longer guarantees 125. Vera, 517 U.S. at 983 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
127. Even though compliance with the VRA can be a compelling government interest, the state must still narrowly tailor its actions to withstand strict scrutiny. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922 (1995) ("Where a State relies on the Department's determination that racebased districting is necessary to comply with the Act, the judiciary retains an independent obligation in adjudicating consequent equal protection challenges to ensure that the State's actions are narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest.").
preclearance. By establishing a replacement benchmark, the dynamic model only preclears voting plans that are sufficiently ameliorative. How should the DOJ or district court go about choosing this replacement benchmark? One option that leaps to mind would set the benchmark at the level of minority voting strength in the last predisaster election. So, returning to an earlier example, if a jurisdiction's minority voters previously elected six out of ten city council representatives, a post-disaster voting plan would be precleared only if it provided the realistic opportunity for that level of success in a post-disaster election. Intuitively simple, this practice would present the benchmark as a general goal that the jurisdiction's procedural reforms must make possible. I nevertheless reject this option because I believe such general mandates grant undue deference to incumbent lawmakers who may have a vested interest in developing mediocre voting reforms after a disaster. A general benchmark, void of specifics, presents substantial situational ambiguity that these lawmakers can exploit. With the pressure to compromise among competing interests (not all of which are necessarily legitimate or well intentioned), incumbents may choose to present the "least best" solution to maintain minority voting strength and may scuttle better alternatives in the process. This distrust is particularly justified in the section 5 context, in which historical anxieties of potential voting discrimination still linger.
In light of this concern, I believe a more appealing and robust approach would give the DOJ or district court ultimate authority to craft a detailed replacement benchmark. Yet instead of carving a benchmark from whole cloth, my proposal would mandate that the DOJ or district court harness the expertise-and self-interest-of local stakeholders before deciding on an alternative. 128 The stakeholders may include community advocates, political parties, incumbent lawmakers, candidates for elected office, and any other organized group or individual who wishes to submit a proposal for an appropriate replacement benchmark.
129 Similar to amici in formal judicial 128. Heather Gerken has envisioned a similar role for local stakeholders in her proposal to reform section 5's administration. See Gerken, supra note 65, at 717. Though Gerken's proposal operates in a different manner from that of this Note, the role she develops for local stakeholders is both powerful and transferable to other contexts, including dynamic benchmarking review. 129. The post-Katrina involvement of stakeholder groups suggests that, far from being disorganized after a disaster, these groups will be fully engaged in the legislative process.
proceedings, 130 these stakeholders should be encouraged to offer concrete proposals to inform the review process. The DOJ or district court should then make those proposals available for public critique and analysis. As a formal matter, all submitted plans should be considered equally; if a covered jurisdiction wishes to submit a proposal, it should not be granted special deference. Doing so would permit jurisdictions to determine the very yardstick against which their actions would later be measured. Special deference might also discourage other stakeholders from submitting their own proposals, as it would connote a hierarchy in which they were disfavored.
Three distinct benefits would flow from openly soliciting local stakeholders' input. First, and most practically, the DOJ or district court could use the various submissions to gather practical information on voting procedures that would be feasible in the aftermath of a disaster. The stakeholders would be likely to deploy their superior local knowledge to present procedures that were more creative and workable than what the DOJ or district court could conceive from afar. And even if the DOJ or district court did not adopt a submitted plan in its entirety, input from stakeholders would still present a menu of options from which a replacement benchmark could be derived. The DOJ already consults local stakeholders informally when considering whether to preclear voting changes. 131 The stakeholder submission process would simply bring this consultation above ground.
Second, an open submission process could promote moderation among various stakeholders. Because the proposals would be publicly available for review, stakeholders with conflicting interests might be less likely to submit unnecessarily generous or stingy examples of a nonretrogressive plan. The built-in contrast would not, of course, synchronize the stakeholders' conflicting interests, but it could help blunt the edges of their proposals, lest they demonstrate bad faith in front of the DOJ or district court.
Finally, consulting local stakeholders addresses the potential criticism that dynamic benchmarking might "exacerbate the 'substantial' federalism costs that the preclearance procedure already exacts." 132 The dynamic model acknowledges superior local knowledge in election administration, which is a deeply rooted fixture of federalism. It then uses the open submission process to capitalize on that knowledge and to increase the chance that the replacement benchmark will enjoy some measure of local "buy-in" or support. 133 Thus, the procedure strikes a compromise: it uses local consultation to guide the DOJ or district court's free hand as it crafts a replacement benchmark, but it also avoids overly constraining the discretion these federal actors need to ensure a post-disaster response that will maintain sufficient minority political strength. There is admittedly no perfect solution to the inherent suspicion that attends giving any government actor-federal or state-discretionary power. Yet by providing an opportunity for substantial collaboration between local stakeholders and the federal government, the open submission process encourages an outcome that reflects both local involvement and federal stewardship.
Exiting Dynamic Benchmarking: One Front Door, One Back Door
The mechanics of dynamic benchmarking ensure that it will be a temporary procedure. As a covered jurisdiction returns to normalcy, the extraordinary post-disaster voting laws will not automatically be used as a benchmark when new laws are submitted for preclearance. Dynamic benchmarking prescribes conducting the same two-step procedural review, querying whether the emergency voting laws are an accurate proxy for minority voting strength. Continuously scrutinizing the replacement benchmark is critical because it provides a procedural exit from the more exacting mandate that dynamic benchmarking establishes in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. As displaced residents decide to return home or to relocate permanently, and as the covered jurisdiction repairs its election infrastructure, extraordinary postdisaster voting procedures should give way to more ordinary procedures.
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To illustrate, consider a jurisdiction that responds to a disaster by automatically distributing absentee ballots to all displaced voters. Under static benchmarking, this charitable law would be enshrined as a benchmark. Any future attempt to scale it back would likely be tagged as a retrogressive change. This scenario could provide a notable disincentive to jurisdictions considering whether to adopt aggressive post-disaster voting reforms.
133. See Gerken, supra note 65, at 710 (discussing this potential to "generate bottom-up support for voting rights enforcement").
134.
Reducing the benchmark of minority voting power is not a betrayal of the retrogression standard. Displaced residents who have taken affirmative steps to relocate (for instance, by registering to vote in other states) should not be included in the VRA's section 5 analysis. Dynamic benchmarking should not artificially attach their citizenship to communities they no longer consider home.
By contrast, under dynamic benchmarking, the jurisdiction would be allowed to recalibrate its voting procedures without running headfirst into a preclearance denial. The dynamic test's threshold inquiry would examine whether the emergency law is still needed to preserve minority voting strength. If the absentee ballot distribution process is needed to maintain this strength, it should be kept as the proper benchmark for the analysis. If it is not so needed-for instance, because minority voters have largely returned home and can vote in person without sacrificing their status quo political power-a less demanding replacement benchmark should be developed to complete the inquiry. This is the "dynamic" core of the model I propose: rather than employing a stubbornly fixed benchmark, the model permits upward or downward adjustment to preserve minority voting strength.
Even though dynamic benchmarking provides for this "front door" procedural escape from the model's high post-disaster standard, an inherent limitation leaves open a "back door": a jurisdiction may avoid the procedure's heightened mandate altogether by leaving its voting laws unchanged. This alternative "exit" results from a simple truth about section 5: while the provision has long maintained the coercive power to influence a jurisdiction that is taking action, section 5 is not equipped to combat the danger of inaction. 135 In other words, section 5 cannot force a jurisdiction to pass a law; it can only grant or deny preclearance to laws that have already been enacted. The democratic process can potentially deter such recalcitrant behavior ex ante or punish it ex post, but in communities that might reward defiance, other tools in the voting rights arsenal, such as section 2 of the VRA, 136 will have to take the lead when a jurisdiction opts to leave its laws unchanged after a disaster. Though section 2 currently lacks well-developed doctrine to address this kind of tactic, a discerning court would almost certainly view such calculated inaction harshly and might be willing to declare that, without reform, the existing voting laws impermissibly diluted minority voters' ability to "participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." 137 Thus, exploiting this limitation in dynamic benchmarking would be a high stakes game for a covered jurisdiction and would likely present a classic Hobson's choice: forced to decide between leaving its voting laws unchanged (a high-risk, low-payoff option) and conforming to the mandate of dynamic benchmarking, a jurisdiction would likely opt to reform its laws and obtain preclearance.
B. Support for Dynamic Benchmarking
Dynamic benchmarking is an attractive alternative because it fits easily within the firmly rooted mechanics of section 5 preclearance and makes alterations to the existing process only when needed to return section 5 to its intended strength in the aftermath of a disaster. Although the model offers an original approach to section 5 enforcement, it finds substantial support in the VRA's legislative history and in previous departures from static benchmarking. This support, in turn, would insulate the proposal from adverse judicial review if Congress embraced dynamic benchmarking as an alternative to the static test.
Legislative History
As discussed earlier, 138 the Beer Court used the VRA's legislative history to justify the retrogression standard. 139 The Beer majority referenced a single passage from a House of Representatives report that framed the section 5 inquiry around whether minority political power was "augmented, diminished, or not affected" by a proposed voting change.
140 Thus, the identification of a retrogressive law rested on movement in minority power. The Court relied on static benchmarking to detect this movement, later asserting that the test flowed "by definition" from the logic of retrogression.
141
Yet the same congressional report that the Beer Court referenced did not endorse static benchmarking as the only way to detect retrogression. Indeed, the House report explicitly encouraged an inquiry that went beyond whether minority political power was augmented, diminished, or not affected by a proposed voting change. Read in full, the report specifically commands that the inquiry be conducted "in view of the political, sociological, economic, and psychological circumstances within the community proposing the change."
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Although omitted from the Beer Court's opinion, this language supports a more nuanced approach to detecting retrogression. Dynamic benchmarking 138. See supra Section I.B.
139. See 425 U.S. 130, 140-41 (1976) .
140.
Id. at 141 (emphasis omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-196, at 60 (1975) ).
141.
Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. 471, 478 (1997) .
142. H.R. REP. at 60. offers such an approach by accounting for potentially disparate circumstances before determining whether a proposed law will increase, decrease, or maintain minority voting power. Static benchmarking, by contrast, has never aspired to incorporate broad-based factors into its analysis. I offer this expanded reading of the House report not to rehash old debates about the Beer Court's curious treatment of a thin slice of legislative history, 143 but rather to engage the Court on its own terms. Drawing support from the same source used to validate the original retrogression standard highlights dynamic benchmarking's appeal as a justifiable addition to section 5 and encourages Congress to view the procedure as a logical extension, not a rejection, of Court precedent.
Previous Departures from Static Benchmarking
The adoption of the dynamic model would not be the first departure from the static benchmarking test. The static test has been notably shelved in three previous scenarios when existing voting laws failed to provide an appropriate benchmark for comparison.
First, in Mississippi v. Smith, 144 the district court held that an existing voting plan should not be used as a benchmark for comparison when the plan has been declared unconstitutional. Instead, the court asserted, a court-ordered plan drawn in the absence of a workable existing plan should become the proper benchmark for section 5 preclearance. 145 The use of the court-ordered plan meant that the State of Mississippi could be denied preclearance for a proposed plan that, while ameliorative compared to its existing (unconstitutional) plan, was retrogressive when compared to the court-ordered plan. 146 The court went on to state that "[i]t would be entirely inconsistent with the teaching of Beer to suggest that the Court must accept a statutory plan that increases black voting strength to a lesser degree than a court-ordered plan in effect."
147 The court-ordered plan in Smith thus resembles the dynamic procedure's replacement benchmark, and the court's holding supports the notion that preclearance can be denied if a proposed plan appears retrogressive compared to a replacement benchmark. Second, in Wilkes County v. United States, 148 the three-judge district court again departed from static benchmarking because the county's existing voting plan was malapportioned. The county, which was 47% black, sought preclearance of its plan to replace its existing single-member districts with an at-large voting scheme. 149 The district court rejected the county's argument that the change was not technically retrogressive because black voters were effectively prevented from electing candidates of their choice under the existing single-member districting plan. The court reasoned that "[s]ince the existing districts are severely malapportioned, it is appropriate, in measuring the effect of the voting changes, to compare the voting changes with options for properly apportioned single-member district plans."
150 Thus, because the existing voting plan was malapportioned, the Wilkes County court was willing to apply a replacement benchmark against which a proposed plan would be measured. Like Smith, this case demonstrates that Beer does not mandate that the DOJ or the district court use an existing voting plan as a benchmark if doing so would undermine the purposes of the retrogression standard.
Finally, in City of Richmond v. United States, 151 the Supreme Court permitted a limited departure from static benchmarking when faced with a proposed annexation. Broadly speaking, an annexation-the incorporation of new territory into a political entity-qualifies as the kind of change covered by section 5 preclearance because of its potential to cause a retrogression in minority political strength. For instance, a city may choose to annex new territory with predominately white voters to reduce the relative strength of its black voters.
City of Richmond presented a situation in which the annexation of new territory reduced Richmond's 52% black majority to a 42% black minority.
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Under Richmond's at-large system of elections, 153 and with Richmond's citizens voting almost exclusively along racial lines, the change meant that black candidates would be unable to win elections in the post-annexation city.
148. 450 F. Supp. 1171 450 F. Supp. (D.D.C. 1978 450 F. Supp. ), aff'd mem., 439 U.S. 999 (1978 .
See Laughlin McDonald, Racial Fairness-Why Shouldn't It Apply to Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act?, 21 STETSON L. REV. 847, 858 (1992) . The Court recognized this potential retrogression but also acknowledged that the static benchmarking test would automatically "forbid all such annexations," 154 even if a jurisdiction had a legitimate reason to seek new territory. The Court's desire to permit the "natural" growth associated with annexations was thus in direct tension with its duty to protect minority voting strength under section 5.
Faced with this quandary, the Court abandoned static benchmarking altogether and struck a compromise that would permit the annexation only if the city agreed to reform its at-large voting scheme and to adopt a ward system that would give black candidates the chance to win elections in majority-black districts. 155 The Court refused to use the city's existing voting plan as a benchmark because any annexation would appear retrogressive in comparison; in its place, the Court employed the compromise plan. If the city refused to adopt the single-member districts envisioned in this replacement benchmark, its proposed annexation would be denied preclearance. But if the city adopted the basket of reforms contained in the replacement benchmark, its proposed annexation would be granted preclearance.
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Read together, Smith, Wilkes County, and City of Richmond indicate a judicial willingness to depart from static benchmarking when the existing voting plan is an inappropriate basis for comparison. The dynamic benchmarking procedure that I propose shares the underlying rationale of these cases, which thereby provide it with a strong foundation of court precedent that will help it withstand judicial scrutiny.
C. Applying Dynamic Benchmarking to Post-Katrina Louisiana
How would the dynamic benchmarking test have assessed Louisiana's post-Katrina voting plan? Most indications suggest that the procedure would have led to a preclearance denial. Under the first step of the dynamic test, the DOJ (or district court) would have reviewed the existing voting laws to determine whether the laws could preserve minority voting strength after the disaster. Evidence such as the extensive voter displacement, damage to the Postal Service and polling locations, and minority voters' historic aversion to Under the second step of the dynamic test-finding an appropriate replacement for the broken benchmark-the DOJ would have solicited the input of stakeholders who had attempted to influence the Louisiana State Legislature's crafting of the emergency voting plan. By seeking their input, the DOJ would have given these stakeholders an equal voice in lawmaking, resurrecting ideas that might have been dismissed in the legislative process and freeing them from the pressure to bargain from a position of weakness.
For Louisiana, the solicitation process inevitably would have focused attention on the major flash point in the post-Katrina debate: whether out-ofstate satellite voting was necessary to prevent retrogression in minority political power. Major civil rights groups had vigorously lobbied the legislature and sought to convince the public that out-of-state satellite voting should be the cornerstone of any post-Katrina voting plan. But the legislature instead opted for more conventional tactics to accommodate displaced voters.
158 Dynamic benchmarking would nevertheless have empowered the DOJ to determine whether satellite voting was a necessary plank in a post-disaster voting plan. All sides of the debate would have had the opportunity to make their case in the open submission process before the DOJ reached its decision. 158. This failure to enact out-of-state satellite voting may reflect the fact that the era of "normal politics"
has not yet arrived in Louisiana. See Gerken, supra note 65, at 709 (defining "normal politics" as a world in which "racial minorities finally wield enough power in the political process to protect themselves"); see also Pildes, supra note 33, at 97 (suggesting that we have reached the "normal, pluralist interest group politics to which the VRA aspired"). Minority voters may still be "discrete and insular" participants in the political process, requiring vigilant protection under section 5 to avoid consistent defeat. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (calling for a "more searching judicial inquiry" for "discrete and insular minorities"). Alternatively, the demise of satellite voting could reflect a flaw in the proposal.
Informed by the available post-Katrina data and liberated from static benchmarking's rigid constraints, the DOJ would likely have concluded that satellite voting, or an equally robust reform, was necessary to avoid retrogression. 159 With a demanding replacement benchmark in place, Louisiana would have been required to adopt further remedies to reduce the likelihood that minority influence would wane after Katrina. A proposed plan that did not meet this mandate would have been rejected out of hand.
This conclusion is supported by data from the 2006 New Orleans municipal elections. The percentage of black voters in the city's electorate dropped from 63% in the 2002 municipal elections to 57% in 2006.
160 Although at first glance this decline might not appear precipitous, it is a historically "substantial" shift for a city the size of New Orleans. 161 In addition, a more granular look at the election data reveals deeply troubling traces of retrogression.
The first disquieting trend shown in the data is that, although overall voter participation declined between 2002 and 2006, the New Orleans electorate shrunk primarily due to the nonparticipation of black voters displaced by Katrina.
162 District-level data reveal that, after Katrina, voting rates among these minority voters plummeted. For instance, in the predominately black Lower Ninth Ward, voter participation declined by nearly 40%.
163 New Orleans East, another predominantly minority neighborhood, experienced a 23% decline in participation.
164 Similar declines appeared in other predominantly minority neighborhoods with substantial populations of displaced citizens. By contrast, in majority-white neighborhoods that endured massive devastation, such as Lakeview, voter turnout was generally stable relative to 2002, declining only 6.4%, an outcome that may reflect existing 159. The DOJ's concession that Louisiana "may well have done more under the circumstances"
shows its awareness that Louisiana opted against more drastic steps to preserve minority voting strength. The implications of this sharp divergence in political participation are potentially severe. John Logan, a Brown University sociologist and preeminent authority on post-Katrina demographics, concluded that "neighborhoods with the highest electoral participation have likely strengthened their hands in the battles over public investment and development planning that are sure to be a 165. John Logan posited that "extensive voter mobilization by civic groups" contributed to this "exceptional turnout" in majority-white neighborhoods. Id. at 15. Yet these communities were also likely to be wealthier, to be more rehabilitated, and to have displaced residents living closer to New Orleans than majority-black communities. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
166. Logan, supra note 160, at 16 tbl.9.
167. I generated this , that the resources will follow the votes. Politicians don't usually serve the city or the public as a whole; they have to be concerned about how they're going to maintain an electoral majority. 169 Thus, a steep decline in minority participation may preface a tremendous decline in minority voters' ability to hold sway in the political process-a factor that Justice O'Connor deemed to be directly relevant in determining the existence of retrogression.
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A second unsettling trend seen in the data is that minority voters attempted to avoid a reduction in their longstanding political dominance by retreating into racial camps and voting along racial lines. Indeed, it is difficult to explain the sudden shift in black voting preferences any other way. The eventual victor, the black incumbent Mayor, Ray Nagin, went from receiving less than 40% of the black vote in 2002 to being favored by 80% of black voters in 2006, when he was paired against a white challenger, Lieutenant Governor Mitch Landrieu.
171 Nagin's support among white voters, by contrast, plummeted from 84% in 2002 to 20% in 2006. 172 According to Logan, this "sea change in the composition of support for [Nagin]" was a "countervailing force" that blunted the impact of widespread minority voter displacement. 173 Rather than support the election of a progressive white mayor, black voters instead consolidated their votes behind a conservative black incumbent whom they had previously disfavored. 174 Although this type of racial bloc voting is not-by itself-a sign of retrogression, its reappearance represents a retreat from progress and a step backwards from the type of cross-racial understanding the Court has consistently identified as the goal of the VRA. Less than six months after the 2006 municipal elections, and only one year since Katrina made landfall, it is still too early to catalogue the full extent of minority voters' post-Katrina decline in political power. I present this postelection data only to support my earlier assertion that the DOJ justifiably could have predicted that Louisiana's emergency voting plan would not provide minority voters with a realistic opportunity to avoid retrogression. Admittedly, given the extent of devastation and displacement caused by Katrina, it might have been impossible for any set of voting procedures to avoid an absolute 178 Second, because of static benchmarking's inability to operate effectively after a disaster, section 5 would have been powerless to prevent Louisiana from doing even less to preserve minority voting strength. Only a procedure like dynamic benchmarking could have compelled the state to adopt further reforms.
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conclusion
With Hurricane Katrina as a tragic backdrop, this Note has endeavored to illuminate a crucial shortcoming in section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. The cornerstone of section 5's preclearance process-the static benchmarking testis incapable of protecting minority voting power in the aftermath of a disaster. The procedure's "sixth-grade" arithmetic proved inappropriate in a postdisaster world that demanded a more complex calculus. Section 5 is not, however, unconditionally wedded to static benchmarking; as I have shown, both its legislative history and case law support an alternative approach, such as the dynamic benchmarking test offered by this Note.
Although the Court has thus far played a dominant role in defining the scope of section 5, dynamic benchmarking is ideally a congressional innovation. Two considerations-one tactical, one normative-justify a legislative strategy. First, while a sympathetic court could read dynamic benchmarking into section 5, minority voters lack standing to prompt judicial intervention under the provision. 179 To get into court, a jurisdiction would have to opt for judicial preclearance of its post-disaster laws, a highly unlikely choice given the time and expense required by that alternative. 180 Second, while Katrina-like disasters are inherently unpredictable and are likely to be rare, this is no excuse for inaction. Waiting until the next 177. The dynamic model I propose recognizes this reality by mandating only that a jurisdiction design a plan that provides minority voters with their best opportunity to avoid retrogression, not a plan that guarantees its avoidance altogether. See supra Subsection III.A.2. Section 5 cannot plausibly mandate that a covered jurisdiction do more without stretching the provision beyond its constitutional limitations. See supra note 127.
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Letter from William E. Moschella to Rep. John Conyers, Jr., supra note 109, at 3.
179.
Cf. Way, supra note 106, at 1443 n.17 ("[I]n contrast to actions under § 5, cases under § 2 can be initiated by private parties in addition to the Justice Department.").
180. See supra note 70.
catastrophe to act on lessons learned from past disasters is illogical. Hoping instead that there will not be another disaster implicating section 5 is simply imprudent. In the spirit of the vigorous debate in the legal academy on emergency constitutionalism, 181 Congress should approve the dynamic model as a legitimate alternative to static benchmarking-before the next disaster strikes. Congress may choose to revisit the recently reauthorized section 5 altogether, 182 which would provide an opportunity to consider a limited innovation like dynamic benchmarking.
Ultimately, congressional action to adopt dynamic benchmarking will simply modernize-not revolutionize-section 5. The proposal admittedly weaves new doctrine into an old quilt, but this intentional modesty further justifies the proposal. It demonstrates that dynamic benchmarking is no stalking horse for a permanent expansion of section 5; instead, the model purposefully echoes the simple request made by countless Katrina survivors that their hard-fought political power not recede with the flood waters. In other words, these survivors asked for nothing more than to be protected against retrogression in their political power. That level of protection has long been section 5's central promise. Dynamic benchmarking seeks only to make it unconditional, come hell or high water. 
